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Detailed transaction and price data from 769 Chinese state-owned enterprises reveal that
corruption | ocial diversion of under-priced in-plan industrial goods to the market |
was pervasive in China between 1980 and 1989. More important, corruption has a signi-
cant impact on the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources in ways that are
consistent with implications of an extended version of Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) model of
corruption. The empirical ndings expose a serious downside of China's gradualist reform
strategy | corruption. In addition to distorting the allocation of resources, corruption had
been blamed for undermining popular support for the reform in 1989.
JEL classication: L51, L12, P211 Introduction
In the spring of 1989, university students, joined later by workers, civil servants and jour-
nalists, held massive demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The demonstrators
shouted slogans and carried banners with texts \Long live democracy" and \Down with
corruption." While there was little agreement on what democracy really meant, all demon-
strators reportedly wanted an end to pervasive corruption.1 Despite the apparent success
of the economic reform in rapidly raising the standards of living for the vast majority of
Chinese, by the late 1980's, there was a growing public perception that the reform had led
to rampant corruption. In particular, the dual-track system, the hallmark of the Chinese
reform, was widely believed to have fueled ocial corruption (Yang and Li, 1993).2 On
June 4, 1989, a bloody crackdown brought the demonstrations to an abrupt end.
The dual-track system was a hybrid economic system under which traditional central
planning (the plan track) and the emerging product market (the market track) coexisted as
means of resource allocation. Under the system, an identical good would often be allocated
on both the plan track and the market track. But the good would typically be sold at a
substantially higher price in the market than in the plan. Ocials who had the discretion
over the allocation of in-plan resources could and allegedly did divert in-plan resources
to the market and pocketed the prots. This corruption was widely known in China as
\guandao" or ocial diversion.
Corruption, dened in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) as the sale by government ocials
of government-produced goods or services for personal gain, has specic implications on
resource allocation. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that if a corrupt ocial has the
opportunity to restrict the quantity that a government-produced good is sold, he would
behave as a bribe-maximizing monopolist. In the case without theft, the corrupt ocial
actually turns over the ocial government price for that good. The ocial price is then part
of the marginal cost that the corrupt ocial faces. An increase in the ocial price would
reduce corruption and the spread of corruption. Corruption would be highly distortionary
1See Adi Ignatius, \Summit Fails to Deter Students from Mounting Criticism of Deng," the Wall Street
Journal, May 17, 1989.
2Corruption is perceived as pervasive not only in China but in many other countries. From surveys of
businessmen and local populations as well as expert opinions, China and some other developing and transition
economies are consistently perceived as among the most corrupt in the world (Transparency International,
1999). In dozens of countries, public outrage over corruption have forced discredited governments out of
oce.
1if complementary government-produced goods are sold by a chain of independent corrupt
ocials. The distortions, the restricted supply of government-produced goods and services
(such as electricity generated by government-owned utilities, building permits and business
licenses) that are essential to the functioning of the economy, would in turn impede economic
development.
Although corruption has both microeconomic and macroeconomic implications, recent
empirical work so far has focused on the macroeconomic implications using available cross-
country aggregate data. For example, Mauro (1995) and World Bank (1997) conrm a link
between higher perceived corruption and lower investment and growth,3 while (Johnson,
Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodru, 1999) nd evidence that links corruption as reported
by rms to unocial activity in post-communist countries. Using aggregate data, these
studies cannot empirically test the microeconomic mechanisms through which corruption
distorts resource allocation, particularly the impact of the ocial price on corruption. Mi-
croeconomic data that document the details on prices and quantities at which corruption
transactions took place are therefore dicult to collect since sales of government-produced
goods and services for private gain are in general unobserved.
However, some needed rm-level data are available, thanks to China's experimentation of
the dual-track system in the 1980s. Under China's dual-track system, certain transactions,
say, the moving of in-plan goods o the plan track, were illegal and hence unobserved.
Other transactions, say the procurement of quota output from a state enterprise and the
selling of inputs acquired o the plan track to the state enterprise at market prices, were
not illegal per se and could leave paper trails. The accounting and reporting rules in force
in the 1980s for state-owned enterprises, still borne strong socialistic characteristics, were
meticulous about recording and tracking the ﬂow of physical materials. Under the rules,
the state-owned enterprise would record, for each transaction, the price, the quantity, and
other relevant attributes, such as whether the transaction is in-plan or outside-plan.
In this paper, I use available accounting data provided by a sample of 769 Chinese
state-owned enterprises that describe their participation in the dual-track system. The
data provide detailed information on both the plan and market prices that the rms face
3A variety of mostly subjective measures of corruption are available. The widely used Corruption Per-
ception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International (1999) is a "poll of polls" drawing upon
numerous distinct surveys of (non-domestic) expert and general public views of the extent of corruption in
many countries around the world.
2and quantities of output sold and input purchased at those prices. In addition to being
microeconomic, the accounting data have a much higher degree of objectivity than existing
measures of corruption. Using the data, I attempt to answer these questions in the paper:
How pervasive was corruption in China in the 1980s and how had the economic signicance
of corruption changed? How did corruption aect the allocation of both in-plan and outside-
plan resources?
In Section 2, I describe brieﬂy the dual-track system and present evidence that docu-
ments corruption as the ocial diversion of in-plan goods procured at the lower plan prices
in the market. To derive testable implications of corruption on resource allocation in the
context of the Chinese economy, I present in Section 3 an extended version of Shleifer and
Vishny's (1993) model to analyze the interaction between state-owned rms and planning
ocials. The model also extends Li's (1999) analysis of China's dual-track pricing system
by endogenizing the determination of quotas. The extended model diers from Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) in the industrial organization of corruption. Since state-owned enter-
prises are allowed to sell outside-plan output in the market, corrupt ocials who sell in-plan
goods face competition from state enterprises in product markets. In this more complicated
model, an increase in the plan price would still decrease corruption as in Shleifer and Vishny
(1993). But other model predictions dier. In particular, while the marginal cost of pro-
duction, borne by the enterprise, remains immaterial to the corrupt ocial, it reduces the
enterprise's production, softens the competition, and therefore tends to increase corruption
by increasing the procurement of output quota and decreasing the distribution of input
quota.
In Section 4, I present additional evidence of corruption based on the available rm-level
data. The estimates of corruption proceeds range from 8% of GDP in 1980 to 11% in 1988,
suggesting that corruption in China was pervasive both before and after the market price
liberalization in 1985. Econometric analysis reveals that corruption has a signicant impact
on the allocation of both in-plan and outside-plan resources in ways that are consistent
with the implications of the theory. Fixed-eects Tobit regressions of output and input
quotas conrm the theoretical prediction that the procurement of output quota and the
distribution of input quota are endogenous. In particular, the plan price is found to lower
the procurement of output quota, while the marginal cost of production is found to increase
the procurement of output quota. Regression analysis of market pricing reveals that after
controlling for the implied endogeneity, the output quota is found to decrease the market
3price of output and hence to increase the total output.
The ndings also suggest it is not the dual-track system per se that bred corruption. The
culprit is the continued reliance of planning. By introducing the market track, the dual-track
system represents a half-way move from the plan toward the market. Economic benets
of such a move have been studied in depth (see for example Byrd, 1991; Li, 1994; Lau,
Qian and Roland, 1997; Li, 1999; Lau, Qian and Roland, forthcoming). The evidence in
this paper shows a serious downside of this reform strategy | corruption. The dual-track
system allowed corruption to continue to exert an allocative role in the economy. This
allocation is distorted since corrupt ocials would procure and divert more resources the
larger the gaps between market and plan prices. Given the arbitrariness of the plan price,
some goods may be over-procured and hence over-produced while others under-produced.
In addition, corruption also undermined popular support for the reform and was reportedly
one of the triggers of the massive demonstrations in 1989. Section 5 makes some concluding
remarks.
2 The Dual-Track System and Corruption
Like many reforms in China, the dual-track system was not created by design, rather it grew
out of informal trading of goods outside planning channels. Beginning in 1979, the govern-
ment gradually allowed state-owned industrial enterprises to sell their extra, outside-plan
output at higher \ﬂoating or negotiated prices." The \negotiated prices" were regulated
and were typically not allowed to exceed plan prices by more than 20 percent. On Jan-
uary 1, 1985, the government lifted the limit on market prices and ocially ushered in the
dual-track system.4
Under the dual-track system, a state-owned enterprise must still fulll its compulsory
output quota, and deliver it to a relevant branch of the Material Supply Bureau (MSB) at
the plan price. In return, the enterprise may be allocated some of the needed material inputs,
as input quota, through plan channels at plan prices. Once it fullls its plan obligations,
the enterprise is allowed to produce more, outside-plan, output and sell it in the emerging
product market, typically at a higher \negotiated" or market price.5 But it must buy
4Accounts of the development of the dual-track system can be found in Byrd (1991) and Naughton (1995).
5For brevity, I will use the term market price to refer to both the \negotiated" price before 1985 and the
true market price after 1985.
4any additional material inputs in the product market, typically at a higher \negotiated"
or market price. The plan prices of both output and inputs, however, continue to be set
centrally by the State Price Bureau, and are often substantially lower than would-be market
clearing prices (i.e., in-plan resources are often in short supply).
The allocation of in-plan resources is handled by ocials in the Material Supply Bureau.
As the economy becomes more decentralized, an increasing amount of in-plan resources is
allocated by ocials in local branches of the Material Supply Bureau. These ocials have
the government mandate and often superior ranks in the bureaucracy than managers of
rms under their supervision. In most cases, they have discretion over the allocation of
in-plan goods (Byrd, 1992).
[Table 1 about here.]
To see how the dual-track system worked in practice, I present some aggregate statistics
on the pricing and allocation of a few key industrial goods. Table 1 shows the plan and
market prices of four industrial goods between 1987 and 1989. Because of inﬂation, both
plan and market prices were rising during the period. But market prices were rising much
faster than plan prices. In the late 1980s, the government, in an eort to curb inﬂation,
limited the increase in plan prices. As a result, the gaps between market and plan prices,
which were quite sizable in 1987, had widened further during the three year period.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 shows that the emerging product market allocated a substantial proportion of
resources under the dual-track system. On the supply side, producers of these commodities
reported that they sold between 22% to 66% of their output at market prices. On the
demand side, enterprises using these commodities as inputs reported that they paid market
prices for between 52% to 85% of their inputs. An interesting point to note here is that for
each commodity with available data, the volume of market transaction reported by buyers
was always substantially more than the volume supplied by producers to the market. For
example, given that the domestic steel production was 56.26 million metric tons (MMT) and
net import was 12.02 MMT in 1987 (State Statistical Bureau, 1989a), the quantity purchased
at market price was approximately (56:26 + 12:02)  :55 = 37:56 MMT while the quantity
sold by domestic steel producers to the market was only 56:26 :22 = 12:38 million metric
5tons. Even if all imported steel, totaling 12.40MMT, were allocated through the market,
reported market purchases would still exceed imputed market sales by 12.78MMT. The
large discrepancy between the quantities sold and purchased at the prevailing market price
is puzzling.
The apparent discrepancy cannot simply be a small sample bias, since the evidence I
present later in the paper will show that it is present for a diverse set of industrial goods (see
Table 3). The discrepancy also seems too big to be explained by the exclusion of imports
as an additional source of market supply since imports accounted for only 14% of GDP in
1987. As discussed, even the sizeable steel import in 1987 was not sucient to close the
discrepancy. A possible explanation is that the proportion of market sales did not include
or underestimated the market sales made by non-state rms. But this cannot explain the
large discrepancy for steel either, since state-owned enterprises supplied nearly all domestic
steel.6 A more plausible explanation is that a sizeable portion of the procured output quota
was diverted. If this explanation is correct, the early discussion implies that perhaps 12.78
MMT of steel was diverted from the plan to the market in 1987. Given the large price gap
reported in Table 1, this diversion could generate as much as 7.32 billion yuan in prots,
an astronomical amount considering that the annual salary of an average worker was 1,459
yuan in 1987.
This explanation is supported by a growing popular perception that government ocials
who controlled the allocation of in-plan resources diverted in-plan resources to the market.7
Guandao, or ocial diversion, was coined to describe this form of corruption. It was reported
(Huang, 1996, p.191) that in-plan steel were sold at between 500 to 1000 yuan per metric
ton above the plan price in the late 1980s. By 1988, ocial diversion had become so
apparent and pervasive, a few Chinese economists undertook the daring task of estimating
the potential rents from diversion | rents embodied in all in-plan resources. Published
estimates vary from 150 to 300 billion yuan in 1988 or 10% to 20% of GNP.8
6In 1987, township and village enterprises' gross industrial output in primary metal industries (comparable
to the 1987 US SIC 2 digit code 33) accounted for less than 5.5 percent of the total (State Statistical
Bureau, 1989b, p. 387{389).
7There is a large body of newspaper reports, journal articles and books in China that document the
pervasiveness of corruption under the dual-track system. For a couple published in policy journals in China,
see Li Maoshen, \Ten Policy Recommendations to Solve the Current Economic Problems," Financial and
Trade Economics, 1989, No. 7; and Zhi Muxing and Gai Shi, \To Where is the Dual-Track System Leading
China?" Economics Weekly, March 26, 1989.
8A short summary of the estimates is reported in Huang and Li (1991) (p. 225). The most widely cited
6As a form of corruption, diversion of in-plan resources is punishable by law if exposed.
To evade detection, corrupt ocials often invest heavily in \diversion technologies." An
elaborate scheme, quite commonly observed (Huang and Li, 1991), is to create a chain of
the so-called pibao gongshi or briefcase companies. A briefcase company is a shell company
that does not have a xed oce and most of its tangible assets | consisting of company
registration, company seal and stationary, and business cards | t into a briefcase. Brief-
case companies are often registered as collectives or subsidiaries to state-owned rms to
provide corrupt ocials added protection. Each briefcase company acts as a middleman
passing the diverted goods for a small and inconspicuous markup. At the end of the chain,
the price eventually reaches the market clearing level. To ensure that rents from diversion
are captured, these companies are often controlled by the ocial's relatives and friends.
Although it is dicult to come up with an accurate estimate of the number of briefcase
companies in a given year, these is evidence that the number is large. The widespread
use of briefcase companies led to a proliferation of \trading" and \kaifa (development)"
companies. In 1986, there were some 328,893 registered \companies" (Huang, 1996, p. 177).
A government crack-down on briefcase companies 1986 reduced the number to 173,000 by
the end of the year. But by 1989, the number of \companies" had risen to 477,400. It
is estimated that briefcase companies in 1988 directly employed 48,000 ocials who held
full-time government appointments in county or higher level oces (Huang and Li, 1991,
p. 228).
There is additional survey evidence that the allocation of in-plan resource is consistent
with ocial corruption. In detailed case studies of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company and
the Second Moter Vehicle Manufacturing Plant, Byrd (1992, pp. 323 and 392) found that
the Material Supply Bureau (MSB) would raise procurement quotas for steel and trucks
when demands for them were strong and force the rms to direct market on their own when
demands were weak. Byrd (p. 392) concluded that \[S]upervisory authorities acted largely
as self-interested entities promoting their own benets and protecting their own interests,
with little regard for [the producer]. MSB in particular seems to have acted primarily to
protect itself from losses that might result from its inability to sell the output it procured.
Not surprisingly, when market conditions rmed up :::, MSB became an advocate of a high
share of mandatory planning."
study is Hu (1989), which estimates that the potential rents in 1988 are worth at least 150 billion yuan.
73 The Model
To derive implications of corruption on resource allocation that are testable using the Chi-
nese data, I extend Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) model of corruption by incorporating the
institutional context of the Chinese economy. The model also extends Li's (1999) analysis
of China's dual-track pricing system by endogenizing the determination of quotas. Follow-
ing Shleifer and Vishny (1993), I focus on the impact of corruption on the allocation of
resources, taking as given the principal-agent relationships between the state (the princi-
pal) and its agents | ocials and managers of state-owned rms. As a result of economic
decentralization in China, the ocials have eective property rights over the allocation of
in-plan resources, and enterprise managers can make market decisions on the margin after
they fulll their in-plan obligations.
Consider a state-owned enterprise that produces a marketable output using a simple
decreasing average cost technology: After incurring a xed cost F  0 in capital, each
additional unit of output requires a units of a single intermediate input and l units of labor.
If the rm pays wage rate W and buys its input, on the margin, at the market price M,i t s
marginal cost of production is simply aM + lW. I assume that the rm, as one of many
users of the input, has no market power in the input market; so it takes M as given. But
because of the legacy of state monopolization under central planning, the rm may enjoy
some market power in its product market. Allowing for the possibility that the enterprise
is a price maker, I hypothesize that the enterprise faces a downward sloping demand curve
D(P) for its output, where P is the market price, D0(P) < 0. This hypothesis will be tested
in the paper against the null that product markets are perfectly competitive.
Under the dual-track system, the rm must fulll its mandatory output quota, Q,a t
the plan price, p. In return, the rm may be allocated an input quota, X, at the plan price,
m. But it has to buy any additional input at the market price M. The output and input
quotas, Q and X, are set, procured and allocated by ocials in the Material Supply Bureau.
In general, the quotas, Q and X, may be set by more than one ocial. For simplicity, I
assume that the quotas are set by a single ocial.9
The plan prices, p and m, are determined by the State Price Bureau, based on historic
production costs according to a set of cost-plus rules.10 Plan prices cannot be changed
9The theory can be easily extended to the perhaps more realistic case where there are more than one
corrupt ocial, without changing the qualitative implications of corruption on resource allocation.
10These rules, issued in government circulars and decrees, are documented in \Wujia Wenjian Xuebian:
8arbitrarily by each individual ocial or rm alone. It is thus reasonable to assume that
individual ocials and rms take plan prices as given.11 Plan prices in China were typically
lower than market clearing prices under the dual-track system (Table 1). The wage rate,
W, is dened as the base wage rate that excludes bonuses tied to the rm's nancial
performance. The base wage rate is controlled by the government and apply to all regular
employees of state-owned enterprises.12
The gap between market and plan prices oers the ocial a strong incentive to divert
plan resources and pocket the proceeds. However, with the planning bureaucracy still
functioning, the ocial may be required to transfer some of the procured quota to the plan
track. For simplicity, I assume that the ocial transfers a xed fraction, 1 − ,o ft h e
output quota to the plan, where  2 (0;1), and diverts the remainder of the quota, Q,
to the market.13 Once in the plan track, the in-plan output Q may be diverted by other
ocials who control its allocation. The amount of the output that is actually sold to nal
customers at the plan price is likely to be smaller than Q.
Similarly, diversion may occur as the ocial allocates the in-plan input. Let (1−)Q
denote the amount of the input available in the plan track, where Q is the output quota
imposed on the input producer and  is the fraction diverted to the market. The amount
of in-plan input that the ocial controls is usually a fraction f  1 of the total amount on
the plan track or Xs = f(1 − )Q. By giving X to the enterprise at plan price m,t h e
ocial diverts Xs−X to the market. The incremental corruption proceeds collected by the
ocial are then (P − p)Q +( M − m)(Xs − X).
Diverting plan resources for private gains is costly. In addition to any direct costs of
selling the diverted goods, the ocial faces punishment in the event that the corruption is
1979{1983" (Selected Pricing Regulations), Price Research Institute, State Price Bureau, 1984.
11This assumption does not rule out the possibility that a coalition of ocials can inﬂuence plan prices.
It has been argued (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) that ocials have an incentive to set plan prices at below
market clearing levels so as to prot from the resulting shortage by selling shortage goods for favors or
bribes.
12In the 1980s, the government determined the wage structure for both managers, technicians and workers,
and set the base wage rate for each wage grade. Except for maintaining some small regional dierences,
the base wage rate for each wage grade applied to all state-owned enterprise employees. State employees
in major cities or in remote (hardship) regions were given a slightly higher base wage rate for a given wage
grade. The wage grade for each employee was determined, according to rules set by the central government,
based the employee's skill, education, and seniority.
13The model can be generalized by endogenizing  without changing the derived testable implications.
Since  is unobserved, such a generalization is superﬂuous.
9exposed. To evade detection, the ocial invests in diversion technologies, by for example
creating a chain of \briefcase companies." Although the diversion technologies reduce the
expected cost of punishment, they are expected to increase the transaction costs of selling
diverted goods. The total cost of corruption, denoted by G(Q)+H(Xs−X), is expected to
increase with the amount of output and input diverted, i.e., G0 > 0a n dH0 > 0. Given the
usually high \progressivity" of punishment for corruption and the increasing complexity
in managing a longer chain of briefcase companies, the cost function is expected to be
convex or G00 > 0a n dH00 > 0. For simplicity, I have assumed that the cost function is
separable, so that an increase in output diversion has no impact on the marginal cost of
the input diversion and vice versa. The separability implies that there are no economies or
diseconomies in scope in diversion activities.14
The ocial chooses Q and X to maximize his proceeds from corruption,
R =( P − p)Q +( M − m)(Xs − X) − G(Q) − H(Xs − X)( 1 )
This specication implies that the bureaucrat must pay the plan price p to procure Q and
that the rm must pay the plan price m to the ocial for X. In other words, there is no
theft of in-plan resources.15
After it fullls its quota Q, the rm faces a residual demand for its outside-plan output.
In the absence of market friction and government restrictions on reselling quota allocations,
the residual demand would simply be d(P)=m a x fD(P) − Q;0g r e g a r d l e s so fh o wQ is
allocated (Tirole, 1988, p. 213). The earlier discussion suggests that reselling (i.e., diverting)
quota allocations is illegal and hence costly. If some of the quota, as required under the
plan, is allocated to and consumed by low valuation customers whose willingness to pay
for the good is below the market clearing price P, the residual demand will be higher than
maxfD(P) − Q;0g. In general, the residual demand can be expressed as a function of
P, Q and ,o rd = d(P;Q;). Assume that d(P;Q;) is continuously dierentiable with
@d=@P < 0a n d@d=@Q < 0. Since the ocial and the rm are competitors in the product
14The cost function would be separable if output diversion and input diversion are each done by a dierent
ocial. Since responsibility over the allocation of in-plan resources is often divided along product lines, it
is quite possible that output and input are diverted by dierent ocials. But it can be easily veried that a
change in the model setup that replaces the single ocial with an \output ocial" and an \input ocial"
does not change model predictions.
15In the case with theft, plan prices would be immaterial to the ocial and the rm, and would therefore
not aect the allocation of resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
10market, it is expected that an increase in Q raises the price elasticity of the residual demand
or @2d=@P@Q  0.
To meet the output quota and the residual market demand, the enterprise produces
Y = Q + d(P;Q;). Its prots from production are
=( P − C)d(P;Q;)+( p − C)Q +( M − m)X − F (2)
where C = Ma + Wl is the marginal cost of production. Since the reform oers the
enterprise nancial incentives to be prot oriented, I assume here that the enterprise sets
P so as to maximize .16
By producing beyond the quota, the rm competes against the ocial in the product
market. Actions taken by the ocial and the enterprise jointly determine the quota and the
market price. In what follows, I model the interaction between the ocial and the enterprise
as a two stage game. In the rst stage, the ocial, acting as a Stackelberg leader,17 sets
Q and X. After receiving the mandatory quotas, the enterprise sets the market price P in
the second stage.
Consider rst the pricing decision of the enterprise. For given (Q;X), the rm would







where e = P(@d=@P)=d is the elasticity of the residual demand. The optimal price P will
be a function of the quotas, input prices and plan prices. Assuming that the prot function
is strictly concave in P, then given the presumed properties of the residual demand curve
d, the following comparative statics properties can be easily shown by dierentiating the
16This is a simplifying assumption. What matters here is that the rm doesn't ignore the prot motive in
making decisions. For case studies on Chinese rms' prot and other objectives during the 1980s, see Byrd
(1992).
17Here it is implicitly assumed that the ocial can credibly commit to his setting of Q and X. One may
argue that this is a strong assumption for a transition economy where even contracts are dicult to enforce.
In a case study, Byrd (1992, p. 321) documented that Anshan, a large steel maker, complained about delayed
announcement of plan targets, insucient deliveries of in-plan inputs. If neither the ocial nor the rm can
credibly pre-commit, it would be appropriate to model the interaction between them as a game in which
both parties move simultaneously. It can be shown that this change will not alter the model's qualitative
results.
11rst order condition, @=@P =0 .
@P=@Q < 0;@ P = @ X =0 ; (4)
@P=@M > 0;@ P = @ W > 0; (5)
@P=@p =0 ;@ P = @ m =0 : (6)
Reﬂecting the fact that the ocial and the rm are competitors in the imperfectly
competitive product market, (4) shows that the ocial can inﬂuence the market price by
exercising its control over Q. By increasing the quota, the ocial \steals" some of the
enterprise's customers and limits its market power. This result reveals that the dual-track
system creates competition between corrupt ocials and state rms. The \intra-marginal
regulatory" benet of the dual-track system identied in Li (1999) is present even under
corruption.18 However, since the enterprise has no market power in the input market,
allocating X to the enterprise is tantamount to giving it a lump-sum subsidy (M − m)X.
A change in X has no impact on P. As expected, in (5) the optimal price P increases with
M and W that make up the marginal cost of producing the outside-plan output. However,
since plan prices aects only intramarginal resource allocation, they should not aect the
optimal market price, as stated in (6).
Anticipating the enterprise's pricing decision P(Q;M;W), the ocial sets Q and X in
Stage 2 to maximize its net payo from corruption R. Since the ocial cannot impose a
negative output quota or procure the input that the rm does not produce, he faces the
constraints Q  0a n dX  0. Consider rst an interior equilibrium where Q>0a n d




Q = p + G0(Q)( 7 )
M = m + H0(Xs − X)( 8 )
The ocial equates his marginal benet of an increase in quota diversion to the marginal
cost. In choosing Q, the ocial, acting as a Stackelberg leader, takes into account the
anticipated decrease in P as he increases Q, as if he faced a downward sloping demand
curve for Q. As is in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the ocial prices p and m contribute to
18A necessary condition for this property to hold is that there are conﬂicts of interest between the ocial
and the rm.
12his marginal costs. Because the market price is decreasing in Q, the ocial has no incentive
to procure beyond the optimal Q dened by (7). The ocial has no incentive to ratchet up
the procurement.
In general, factors that raise the marginal benet or reduce the marginal cost of cor-
ruption increase corruption. Consider rst the comparative statics on Q. Dierentiate (7)
with respect to each exogenous variable Z = p;m;W; and M,a n ds o l v ef o r@Q=@Z.T h e
results are summarized below.
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@p


























where MRQ = P + Q@P=@Q is the marginal revenue from diverting output quota Q.
(9) shows the Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) eect of the ocial price on the allocation of
in-plan resources. An increase in p raises the marginal cost of diversion, and should reduce
diversion of the procured output. (10) states that m has no eect on Q, under the separa-
bility assumption imposed on the diversion cost function, which eectively excludes m from
the output quota equation. Equations (11) and (12) indicate that additional assumptions
are needed to sign the eects of M and W on Q.S i n c e@P=@M > 0a n d@P=@W > 0( f r o m
(5)), if the marginal revenue (P +Q@P=@Q) has the same monotonicity properties of the av-
erage revenue, P(Q;W;M), with respect to M and W,w ew o u l dh a v e@MRQ=@M > 0a n d
@MRQ=@W > 0. If this condition holds, an increase in M or W that causes the enterprise
to raise P will shift the ocial's marginal revenue curve upward, thereby inducing him to
raise Q. In sum, the analysis suggests that the equilibrium output quota, Q = Q(p;M;W),
is decreasing in p, and increasing in M and W, under certain conditions.
By symmetry, the output quota, Q, imposed on the input producer should in equilib-
rium have similar comparative statics. Namely, Q = Q(m;M;W) should be decreasing
in m, the plan price, increasing in M, the market price of another input that the in-
put producer in question needs in production, and in W, the base wage rate that the
input producer faces. As a result, the amount of in-plan input that the ocial controls,
13Xs = Xs(m;M;W) should be decreasing in m,i n c r e a s i n gi nM and W.A n dXs should
not be aected by M or W.
To obtain comparative statics results on X, I substitute Xs = Xs(m;M;W)i n t o
(8), then dierentiate both sides of the equation with respect to each exogenous variable






















@M > 0 (17)
@X
@W > 0 (18)
Here the Shleifer-Vishny eect of m on X is complicated by the eect of quota avail-
ability. As shown in (14), the sign of the eect of m on X is ambiguous. An increase in
m raises the cost of diversion and therefore should induce the ocial to transfer more of
the in-plan input he controls to the enterprise at m. But an increase in m reduces the
procurement of in-plan input and hence the amount of in-plan input that he controls. The
two eects oset each other, making it dicult to ascertain the net eect of m on X.T h e
eects of other variables on X are unambiguous and intuitive. (13) shows that an increase
in p has no eect on X since p is excluded from (8). (15) shows that M has a negative
eect on X.A ni n c r e a s ei nM raises the marginal revenue from diversion and hence reduces
X.A ni n c r e a s ei nW, however, aects neither the marginal prots from diversion nor the
size of Xs, hence has no impact on X (see (16)). An increase in M or W increases the
availability of in-plan input and consequently X ((17) and (18)).
The above comparative statics results are derived based on the interior equilibrium. But
if the ocial cannot protably set Q>0o rX>0, a boundary equilibrium (Q =0o rX =0 )
occurs. In a boundary equilibrium, the ocial would set Q =0i fPjQ=0 <p+ G0jQ=0.
Similarly he would set X =0i fM −m>H 0jX=0. Therefore, factors that decrease Q or X
in an interior equilibrium are the ones that raise the likelihood of a boundary equilibrium.
143.1 Perfectly competitive product markets
The implications of corruption on resource allocation, summarized by equations (4){(6)
and (9){(18) are derived under a set of substantive economic assumptions that describe
the institutions under which the rm and the bureaucrat operate. An empirical rejection
of a derived implication could mean either a rejection of the theory, or a rejection of one
or more of the assumptions. While there are many alternatives, not all of them change
model predictions (see the remarks in footnotes 9 and 17). To rule out the possibility
that the empirical results in the paper are not driven by a wrong assumption about the
product market structure, it will be useful to test implications of corruption derived under
alternative assumptions of market structure. An interesting alternative market structure is
perfect competition.19
In a perfectly competitive product market, both the rm and the bureaucrat are price
takers. The market price, P, will therefore not be aected by changes in Q or X.B u tt h e
price P will aect the allocation of plan resources under corruption. Taking P as given, the
bureaucrat, maximizing his payo from corruption would set Q and X such that,
P = p + G0(Q) (19)
M = m + H0(Xs − X) (20)
Under the assumption that G(Q)a n dH(Xs − X) are convex, one can analogously derive

















































@W = 0 (24)
As expected, (21) shows that the procurement of output quota, Q, is increasing in the
market price P and decreasing in the plan price p. The results reveal that the Shleifer-
19Some analyses of China's dual-track system have assumed that the emerging product market is perfectly
competitive (e.g., Byrd, 1991; Lau et al., 1997).
15Vishny eect of the ocial price on corruption are present under perfect competition. Since
an increase in the ocial price p raises the marginal cost of corruption regardless of the
product market structure, this eect should in general be robust to market structure. As
implied by the separability of the cost function, (22) shows that an increase in m has no
impact on Q. However, there are marked dierences in how M and W aect Q under
perfect competition than under imperfect competition. Since both M and W do not enter
(19) directly, they should have no impact on Q once the eect of the competitive market
price P are taken into account. This is intuitive since under perfect competition, marginal
cost pricing implies any increase in M or W would have already been passed completely
to customers as increased market price P. Perfect competition in the output market thus
implies that Q = Q(P;p)i si n c r e a s i n gi nP and decreasing in p. By symmetry, perfect
competition in the input market implies that Xs = Xs(M;m)i si n c r e a s i n gi nM and
decreasing in m.
As implied by the separability of the cost function, (24) shows that the output prices P
and p have no eect on X. The eect of m on X is ambiguous as in the case under imperfect
competition for the same reason discussed earlier. But there are dierences in how M and
W aect X. Under perfect competition, M has an ambiguous eect on X. The reason is
that Xs is an increasing function of M under perfect competition. An increase in M raises
the amount of in-plan input available and hence the amount that would be given to the
enterprise at m, thereby counteracting the negative eect identied earlier under imperfect
competition. Under perfect competition, neither W, M,n o rW should have any eect on
X since neither inﬂuences the availability of in-plan input Xs.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I rst describe the available data and assemble evidence that documents the
presence of ocial diversion. Then, I estimate corruption proceeds from diversion. Finally,
after a brief discussion of the econometric specications, I present and discuss the empirical
results.
164.1 The Data
The data come from a survey of 769 Chinese state-owned enterprises conducted in 1990 by
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in collaboration with Western economists.
Annual data between 1980 and 1989 are collected. The sample covers a diverse selection
of state enterprises. Located in four provinces (Jiangsu, Jilin, Shanxi, and Sichuan), these
enterprises represent 36 (out of a total of 40) two-digit industries in mining, logging, utilities,
and manufacturing.20 The data set is particularly rich in information on the enterprise's
participation in the dual-track system, giving details on the planned prices and market
prices as well as the volumes of outputs and inputs transacted at these prices. Adopting
the procedures (and computer codes) developed by Li (1994) and Li (1997), I construct
price and quantity variables that are relevant to this study. Below I give a brief description
of the procedures and the measured variables.
A. Prices
Under the dual-track system, sales and purchases are recorded in mixed prices|weighted
averages of market prices and plan prices. The data contain detailed price information,
which allows the construction of enterprise-specic indexes of mixed prices for output, ma-
terial inputs, as well as ratios of market prices to mixed prices and plan prices for output
and for material inputs. Using the price information, I construct, for each enterprise n,t i m e
series indexes of market prices of output, Pi
nt  Pnt=Pn;80, market prices of material inputs,
Mi
nt  Mnt=Mn;80, plan prices of output, pi
nt  pnt=pn;80, and plan prices of material inputs,
mi
nt  mnt=mn;80. Here 1980 is the base-year and Pn;80, Mn;80, pn;80 and mn;80 are the (un-
known) enterprise-specic base-year prices. Before the price liberalization in January 1985,
the \market" prices are measured as the \negotiated" prices, which remained under price
control. The weighted average annual rates of market price inﬂation and the gaps between
market prices and plan prices for both output and material inputs are reported in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
The market price inﬂation for both output and material inputs accelerated after 1985,
when price control was lifted. The material price inﬂation was higher, on average, than
output price inﬂation, reﬂecting the structural changes in resource allocation that were
20Adopted in 1985, China's industry classication is comparable to the ISIC.
17undoing the underpricing of material inputs imposed by central planning. Consistent with
the aggregate statistics in Table 1, the gaps between market prices and plan prices widened
considerably between 1985 and 1989. But the price gaps reported here are much smaller
than those in Table 1. Given our highly diverse sample of enterprises, it appears that the
goods in Table 1 were in more severe shortage at plan prices than most other industrial
goods.
B. Output quota and input quota
For each enterprise, a time series of output quota Qnt, measured in 1989 market prices,21
is constructed by rst converting quota sales in current year plan prices to 1989 plan prices
and then multiply the resulting series by the ratio of 1989 market price to 1989 plan price. A
time series of input quota Xnt, measured in 1989 market prices, is constructed analogously
for each enterprise. Enterprise n's total real sales in year t, Ynt, is then the sum of Qnt
and the enterprise sales to the market in year t measured in 1989 market prices. Total real
purchases of inputs for enterprise n in each year are constructed analogously.
Zero output quota accounts for 22% of all observations between 1980 and 1989 for which
output quota is not missing, and zero input quota accounts for 49% of all observations
for which input quota is not missing. These statistics suggest that at any given time
more rms were required to sell their output at plan prices than were given inputs at plan
prices. Furthermore, as Table 3 shows, the proportion of output sold at plan prices is always
higher than the proportion of input bought at plan prices for each year in the sample. These
ndings, based on microeconomic data from a diverse set of state-owned enterprises, conrm
the aggregate evidence of in-plan resource diversion in Section 2. Corruption, therefore, did
not appear to be an isolated phenomenon conned to only a few commodities.
C. Base wage
To be consistent with the theory, wage should be dened as one that is exogenous to the
rm and the ocial. In this paper, wage is measured as base wage per worker | total base
wage payment divided by the total average number of employees in the enterprise in the year.
The base wage rate for each wage grade is determined by the Chinese central government
21Since market prices in 1989 | the last year in the sample | were presumably less distortionary than
either plan prices or market prices in earlier years, all quantity variables are measured in 1989 market prices
to make them comparable both over time and across enterprises.
18and apply to all employees of state-owned enterprises.22 The wage grade for each employee
is in turn determined, according to rules set by the central government, based the employee's
technical skill, education, and seniority. This denition excludes bonuses that are often tied
to the rm's nancial performance.
4.2 Corruption Proceeds
If there were no diversion of in-plan resources, the market values of output and input quotas
should be roughly the same: on average the procurement of in-plan resources should equal
the distribution of in-plan resources. But this is not what we see in the data. In the rst
two columns in Table 4, I report the average market value (in 1989 market output prices)
of output quota taken from sample enterprises and the average market value of input quota
(in 1989 market input prices) given to sample enterprises.23 The average market value of
output quota exceeded the average market value of input quota in each year between 1980
and 1989. On average more resources were procured into the plan track than distributed
through the plan track. Some of the in-plan resources must have been diverted to the
market track. The gap in the market values between output and input quotas in a given
rm represents a direct measure of corruption proceeds collected from the rm. Column 3
reports the average of corruption proceeds per rm for each year in the sample. Between
1980 and 1989, the average corruption proceeds per rm more than doubled.
Dividing the average corruption proceeds per rm by total sales per rm gives the sales-
weighted average corruption proceeds as a proportion of total sales. Column 4 in Table 4
shows that sales-weighted average corruption proceeds grew from 22% of total sales in 1980
to as much as 45% in 1989. The t-ratios of the estimates, reported in parentheses,24 indicate
that the sales-weighted averages of corruption proceeds are quite precisely estimated.
[Table 4 about here.]
22The government maintained some small regional dierences in the base wage rate. State employees in
major cities or in remote (hardship) regions were given a slightly higher base wage rate for a given wage
grade.
23Because of price control, the \market prices" before 1985 would underestimate the market values of
in-plan goods. Using the 1989 market prices should eliminate the downward biases.
24Robust standard errors of the estimates, with correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Andrews, 1991), are obtained by regressing R/GIO on year dummies. To estimate sales-weighted averages,
each observation in the regression is weighted by total sales.
19If the sample is representative of China's state-owned industry,25 then using the esti-
mated corruption proceeds, one can impute the size of corruption proceeds relative to GNP
using the following formulae,
R/GNP = Sales-weighted average of (R/Sales) 
State-owned rms' share of industrial output 
Industrial sector's share of GNP (25)
Aggregate times series data on state-owned rms' share of the aggregate industrial output
and the industrial sector's share of Gross National Product are from State Statistical Bureau
(1991). The results are presented in Column 5 in Table 4.
On average, corruption proceeds accounted for 9% of GNP in the 1980s. As expected,
corruption was a bit more serious in the late 1980s than in earlier years.26 Considering
that in 1989 government revenue accounted for only 16.2% of the GNP (State Statistical
Bureau, 1991), estimates in Table 4 imply that corruption in China in the 1980s was a
serious economic and political matter. If the government were to sell in-plan resources at
market prices itself, it could boost its revenue on average by an amount equal to 9% of
GNP. The implied loss in government revenue due to corruption is thus staggering.
It is interesting and perhaps surprising to some observers that the estimated corruption
proceeds are not much lower in as early as 1980 than in 1989, the year when students
marched on to Tiananmen Square to demand democracy and an end to corruption. In
1989, the popular perception of ocial corruption was probably the highest in the history
25As discussed, the sample covers almost all two-digit industries. The number of rms in each industry
covered in the sample correlates well with the total number of rms in each industry in China (Li, 1994).
Looking at some important performance measures, say, labor productivity, the sample statistics also match
well national aggregates. The sample average of labor productivity (output per person) between 1980 and
1989 is 14,600 yuan/person (in 1980 constant prices) while the aggregate counterpart is 14,690 yuan/person
(source: the author's estimation and State Statistical Bureau (1991)). The weighted average of growth rate
of output in the sample is also very similar to the national average.
26My estimates of corruption proceeds from diverting in-plan resources are smaller than the estimates
reported in the Chinese media. But this is expected. The estimates summarized by Huang and Li (1991)
are potential proceeds from diversion embodied in in-plan resources. They provide upper bounds on corrup-
tion proceeds since some of the in-plan resources were actually allocated at plan prices to nal customers.
With available data on in-plan deliveries of inputs to state-owned enterprises, I am able to estimate actual
corruption proceeds. Using my data, the potential proceeds from corruption between 1980 and 1989 amount
to 18% of GNP, near the high end of existing estimates.
20of the People Republic.27 In the writings of some Chinese economists (see for example the
references in Yang and Li, 1993), corruption is the by-product of the dual-track system.
The implicit presumption is that ocial diversion didn't exist before the introduction of
the dual-track system. My estimates, using rm-level data, reveal that this presumption
does not match reality. Results from econometric analyses below will further conrm that
corruption was present in as early as 1980. This bags the question: Why was public
perception of corruption low in the earlier years of reform, and why did it rise so quickly in
the late 1980s?
Part of the answer may be that the nature of corruption had changed in the 1980s.
First, the economic reform in the 1980s had signicantly decentralized the economy, giving
many lower-level ocials the rights to make allocation decisions and hence the opportunity
to divert in-plan resources. The decentralization may have \democratized" corruption,
allowing top-level as well as low-level ocials to participate in \ocial diversion." This
conjecture is supported by the data. In the last column of Table 4, I report estimates of
unweighted or simple arithmetic average of corruption proceeds as a proportion of sales and
the corresponding t-ratios. The unweighted averages are smaller than the sales-weighted
averages in all years and are considerably smaller in the early 1980s. This suggests that the
diversion of in-plan resources in earlier years is more concentrated in larger enterprises that
are supervised by higher-level ocials. The narrowing of the gap between the two averages
towards the end of 1980's is indicative of the spread in corruption to lower-level ocials who
controlled smaller rms. Secondly, the introduction of the market track helped monetize
corruption and may have signicantly reduced the transaction costs of ocial diversion.
Under tight price control, corrupt ocials would have to rely on costly barter exchanges
to trade diverted goods.28 By reducing the transaction costs of corruption, the dual-track
system may have increased the pervasiveness of corruption in China. By helping monetize
corruption, the dual-track system also heightened public awareness of corruption since under
the Chinese law corruption must involve monetary payos. The increased pervasiveness of
corruption could have helped boosting public perception of corruption to levels unseen in
27Some of the workers who joined the demonstration in 1989 were nostalgic for the pre-reform days when
the government was perceived as \clean" (see for example, Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1989, \People's
Republic: Chinese Communism Faces a Crossroads as the Masses Speak").
28Before the emergence of product markets, corrupt ocials would have received in-kind payments and
favors, such as desirable jobs for their children. Such ocial indiscretion was pervasive in the pre-reform
China.
21the history of the People's Republic.
4.3 Econometric methods
Structural relations that determine rm n's (log) market price in year t,l n Pnt, output
quota, Qnt, and input quota, Xnt, as implied by rst order conditions (3), (7) and (8), can
be expressed in the following linear specication,
lnPnt = QQnt + W lnWnt + M lnMnt + 0
nt (26)
Qnt = p lnpnt + W lnWnt + M lnMnt + m lnmnt + 0
nt (27)
Xnt = γp lnpnt + γW lnWnt + γM lnMnt + γm lnmnt + 0
nt (28)
where lnWnt is the log of rm n's base wage rate in year t,l nMnt is the log of market price




are random errors (not necessarily of mean zero).
This system of three equations consist of three endogenous variables (lnPnt, Qnt and
Xnt). The remaining four variables (lnWnt,l nMnt,l npnt,a n dl nmnt) are typically beyond
the control of either the rm or the ocial. As discussed, the base wage rate and plan prices
are set and adjusted by the central government. The market price of input is typically set
by imperfectly competitive producers. Among many buyers, an individual buyer usually
has little inﬂuence over the market price of input. The plan prices, the base wage rate and
the market price of input can thus be considered exogenous. The exclusion of lnpnt and
lnmnt from (26) implies that the system is identied.
But as they stands, equations (26){(28) are not estimable because of the following
data limitations. First, only price indexes are observed. That is only Pi
nt  Pnt=Pn;80,
pi
nt  pnt=pn;80, Mi
nt  Mnt=Mn;80,a n dmi
nt  mnt=mn;80, where 1980 is the base year, are
observed. Second, the observed output and input quotas are censored, since a signicant
number of rms reported that they had zero output or input quotas. The theory implies
that the ocial would set zero quotas if it is unprotable to set positive quotas. In other
words, the observed output and input quotas are simply Qnt =m a x fQ
nt;0g and Xnt =
maxfX
nt;0g,w h e r eQ
nt and X
nt are the latent output and input quotas. Finally, two
unobserved variables, the base wage rate W
nt and market input price M
nt that rm n's
input supplier faces, are omitted from (28). Below, I address the econometric issues imposed
22by the data limitations for each of the three equations.
Consider rst the output quota equation (27). Using observed price indexes and observed
output quota Qnt, the equation can be rewritten as
Qnt =m a x fp lnpi
nt + W lnWnt + M lnMi




t + nt;0g (29)
where p lnpn;80 + M lnMn;80 + m lnmn;80 has been absorbed into 
q
n, which accounts
for the enterprise-specic eects in (29), 
q
t measures the time-specic eects, and nt the
idiosyncratic error. In addition to absorbing the enterprise-specic base-year prices, 
q
n also
captures unobserved enterprise-specic factors that may aect Qnt. Such factors include,
for example, product characteristics, enterprise-ocial relationship and changes in the dual-
track system that is specic to the enterprise. The time-specic eects, 
q
t , capture the
eects of unobserved macroeconomic factors that inﬂuence Qnt uniformly for all rms.
Examples of these factors include inﬂation, nationwide anti-corruption campaigns and the
general trend in the development of the dual-track system. Taking into account the fact
that some observations of Qnt are censored at zero, equation (29) species a xed-eects
Tobit model where the xed eects enter nonlinearly.
For such a specication, the traditional Tobit estimator that maximizes a likelihood
function over all parameters, including the xed eects, are consistent and asymptotically
normal only if both the number of rms and the number of years approach innity (Heckman
and MaCurdy, 1980). This estimator may exhibit signicant small-sample biases if applied
to our data since the number of available observations per rm is limited to ten. However,
the model can be estimated consistently using Honor e's (1992) semi-parametric method
for xed-eects Tobit models. The method exploits a symmetry in the distribution of the
latent variables. If the true parameter values were known, then trimming could introduce
the same symmetry in the distribution of the observed variables. The symmetry suggests
orthogonality conditions which must hold at the true parameter values. Each orthogonality
condition in eect compares two observations per individual (rm). These orthogonality
conditions are used to construct objective functions. Honore's estimators are then dened as
the parameter values that minimize the objective functions. Honor e (1992) shows that the
estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal if the included regressors are exogenous,
and if, conditional on the xed eects and included regressors, the idiosyncratic errors, nt
23and ns for all t 6= s, are independent, identically and continuously distributed.29 Honore's
semi-parametric method is more robust than the traditional Tobit, for it does not require
a parametric distribution for the idiosyncratic errors, or homoskedasticity across rms.
Similarly for the input quota equation, we can rewrite (28) as
Xnt =m a x fγp lnpi
nt + γW lnWnt + γM lnMi
nt + γm lnmi
nt + x
n + x
t + nt;0g (30)
where x
n and x
t are the enterprise-specic and time-specic eects, and nt is the idiosyn-
cratic error. As a xed-eects Tobit model, equation (30) can be estimated using Honor e's
(1992) method. But the estimates may be aected by omitted variables biases. Conditional
on the xed eects, the error term nt may contain idiosyncratic components of lnM
nt and
lnW
nt. But because of uncoordinated market forces and random sampling of enterprises,
it is possible, conditional on the xed eects, that the idiosyncratic component of lnM
nt is
not correlated with the included regressors. The same logic may not apply to lnW
nt.S i n c e
changes in the base wage rate are coordinated by the central government, it is possible that
even after controlling for the xed eects the idiosyncratic component of lnW
nt is positively
correlated with lnWnt. Since lnWnt is predicted to have no impact on Xnt while lnW
nt is
predicted to raise Xnt under imperfect competition (see (18)), the coecient on lnWnt is
likely to be biased upward. Without additional data, the omitted variables biases cannot
be easily corrected.
For both the output and input quota equations, the discussed econometric method is
also applicable to the case where the output market is perfectly competitive. As implied by
(19) and (20), the only modication to (29) and (30) needed in this case is to add lnPi
nt as
a regressor in both equations.
Turn now to the pricing equation (26) under the null hypothesis of imperfect competi-
tion. I apply a rst-order, year-on-year dierence on both side. Doing so yields,
lnPi
nt = QQnt + WlnWnt + MlnMi
nt + 
p
t + nt (31)




29As Honor e (1992, p. 543) commented, the assumption that nt and ns \are independent is less restrictive
than it may seem. The xed eects can capture some dependence between the error terms. For example,
[the assumption is] satised if the error terms are joint normal, with equal variance but arbitrary positive
correlation. Dependent normals with positive correlation can be written as a (normal) xed eect plus
independent normals|the dependence can be captured by the xed eect."
24ing, we have eliminated from (31) rm-specic xed eects, including rm-specic base-year
log prices. Note the use of the observed, actual output quota, Qnt, in the specication. This
is appropriate since each rm actually faces the observed output quota. It would be wrong
to use the latent quota, Q
nt, as rms were never given negative output quotas.
The observed output quota Qnt is endogenous, and likely correlated with the idiosyn-
cratic error nt. For example, if the ocial expects an upward shift in the market demand
for the rm's output that will increase nt, he would have an incentive to raise Qnt, resulting
in a positive correlation between Qnt and nt (Byrd, 1992). To estimate (31) consistently,




nt,a n dl nWnt, a constant, and year dummies. These variables
should be correlated with the regressors in (31) (see (29)) but not correlated with the id-
iosyncratic error nt. The GMM estimates should therefore be consistent and asymptotically
normal.
4.4 Empirical results
Panel A of Table 5 reports four sets of estimates for the parameters of the output quota
equation (29) using xed-eects Tobit. The time-specic eects, estimated by including year
dummies in the regression, are not reported in the table. In the rst three columns, two sets
of estimates are presented from model specications that assume imperfectly competitive
markets. Column 1 reports estimates obtained under the hypothesis that the parameters
are time invariant. This hypothesis is relaxed for estimates in Columns 2 and 3 to allow
parameters to dier before and after the price liberalization in January 1985. For compar-
ison, Columns 4 to 6 report the same two sets of estimates from specications that assume
perfectly competitive markets, where an additional regressor, \log market output price," is
included in the regression. Panel B of Table 5 reports the same four sets of estimates for
the input quota equation (30).
[Table 5 about here.]
Inspection of the signs of the estimated coecients in the rst three columns of Table 5
reveals that all variables operate more or less as predicted. Focus rst on the estimates
in Panel A. \Log plan output price" increases corrupt ocials' marginal cost of diversion.
It should reduce the amount of output quota that the ocial procures and diverts. The
25estimated negative coecients on this variable in Table 5 empirically conrm the presence
of the Shleifer-Vishny eect of the ocial price on corruption. \Log market input price" and
\log base wage rate" both increase the marginal cost of production that the rm faces. In an
imperfectly competitive market, they raise the market price of output for any given output
quota. If the resulting upward shift in the market price increases the marginal revenue in
diverting output quota, it would raise the procurement and the diversion of output quota.
It is therefore not surprising to nd that the estimated coecients on both variables are
positive and statistically signicant. There is a negative but (statistically) insignicant
eect of the plan price of input on output quota. This is consistent with model predictions
derived under the assumption that the diversion cost function is separable, suggesting that
there may indeed be few economies of scope in quota diversion.
Turn next to the estimates of (30) in Panel B under the hypothesis of imperfect competi-
tion. As discussed, the estimates may be aected by omitted variables biases. In particular,
estimates of the coecient on \log base wage rate," which are predicted to have no eect
on X, may be biased upward. Table 5 shows that the bias appears to be concentrated in
the second half of the 1980s. However, the estimate based on the whole sample (Column 1)
shows little evidence of a upward bias. The results suggest that the omitted variables biases
are not strong enough to alter the qualitative results. With this in mind, we now examine
estimates of the remaining parameters.
As discussed, \log plan input price" is expected to have ambiguous eect on X because
the Shleifer-Vishny eect is oset by the eect of m on the availability of in-plan input (Xs).
Estimates of the coecient on \log plan input price" are small and statistically insignicant,
suggesting that the two osetting eects may be roughly equal in strength. \Log market
input price" raises the marginal revenue of input diversion, therefore should reduce X.
Estimates of the coecient on this variable are indeed negative and statistically signicant.
There is a positive but (statistically) insignicant eect of the plan price of output on X.
This is again consistent with the model prediction derived under the assumption that the
diversion cost function is separable, oering additional support for the hypothesis that there
are few economies of scope in quota diversion.
In contrast, inspection of the signs of the estimated coecients in the last three columns
of Table 5 reveals that most of the variables do not operate as hypothesized under the
assumption of perfect competition. Theoretically, an increase in lnPi
nt raises the marginal
revenue of diversion. Holding everything else constant, this should increase Q. Estimates
26of the coecient on lnPi
nt in Panel A, however, are negative and statistically insignicant
at the 5% level. Estimates of the remaining parameters are qualitatively similar to those
in Columns 1-3, even though in theory they should dier substantially. For example, under
perfect competition, both lnMi
nt and lnWnt should have negligible impact on Qnt.T h e
estimates in Table 5 show that both variables have signicantly positive impact on Qnt.T h e
inconsistencies between theory and empirics under the assumption of perfect competition
but not under the assumption of imperfect competition provides strong evidence against
the hypothesis of perfect competition. They suggest that \log market output price" should
be treated as an endogenous variable as implied by imperfect competition. In the discussion
below, we maintain the hypothesis that product markets are imperfectly competitive.
To what extent did the eects of corruption on resource allocation change as a result
the full implementation of the dual-track system that liberalized market prices in 1985?
Answer to this question is of interest since estimates of corruption proceeds in Table 4 show
that diversion of in-plan resources was already quite serious even in the early 1980s. A
comparison of estimates before and after the liberalization in Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A
shows that there is no qualitative change in how the output quota responds to changes in the
included variables. This result reveals strikingly that even before the full implementation of
the dual-track system, the allocation of in-plan resources is consistent with the hypothesis
of corruption. The econometric analysis thus conrms the ndings summarized in Table 4
that ocial diversion was not new and may well have existed before the economic reform.
The ndings here oer direct evidence of ocial corruption under planning. This paper thus
provides strong evidence for Shleifer and Vishny's (1992) theory of shortage in Soviet-type
economies.
But there are quantitative dierences in the size of the estimated coecients. The
estimated Shleifer-Vishny eect is stronger before price liberalization: a one percentage
point increase in the plan price would reduce the output quota by 73,000 yuan between
1980 and 1984 and by 56,600 yuan between 1985 and 1989. The estimated eects of lnMi
nt
and lnWnt on Qnt are stronger after the liberalization: a one percentage point increase
in the market input price (the wage rate) would increase output quota by 37,400 yuan
(11,500 yuan) between 1980 and 1984 and by 42,000 yuan (65,500 yuan) between 1985 and
1989. However, Wald tests, conducted separately for each parameter pair, rejected at 5%
signicant level only the hypothesis that the parameter on \log base wage rate" is identical
before and after the liberalization. The decrease in the estimated Shleifer-Vishny eect
27after the liberalization is not statistically signicant.
The increase in the response of output quota to changes in the base wage rate, and less
statistically signicantly in the market price of input, is probably due to increased product
market competition as a result of the price liberalization and the concurrent reduction in
entry barriers into industries once monopolized by state-owned enterprises. Evidence of
increased competition is provided by Li (1997) who nds that the estimated markup ratio
(or the Lerner index) of state-owned enterprises declined signicantly between 1980 and
1989. As increased competition squeezes tighter a rm's prot margin, an increase in the
marginal cost of production will likely be passed through more fully to the customers in the
form of increased output price. Holding everything else constant, an increase in the wage
rate or in the market price of input in a more competitive environment would likely cause
a higher upward shift in the equilibrium market price of output. This in turn would induce
a higher rise in output quota.
Diversion of in-plan resources is also expected to intensify product market competition.
As discussed in Section 3, by selling in-plan goods at market prices, the corrupt ocial
competes against the producer in the market. As a result, the output quota imposed on
the enterprise should have a negative eect on the equilibrium market price. To test this
and other implications summarized in equations (4){(6), I estimate (31) using the GMM
procedure discussed earlier. Table 6 reports the regression results. For comparison, I also
report an OLS regression in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here.]
Inspection of the signs of the GMM estimates in Table 6 reveals that all variables operate
as predicted. The estimated coecients on Qnt are all negative, suggesting that quota
diversion did exert competitive pressures on imperfectly competitive producers. For any
given output quota, an increase in either the market price of input or in the base wage rate
raises the marginal cost of production and therefore should prompt the enterprise to raise
its market price. As predicted, the estimates of the coecients on lnMi
nt and lnWnt are all
positive.
But there are visible dierences in the magnitudes of GMM estimates under dierent
model specications. Column 1 (GMM1) report GMM estimates using the full sample under
the assumption that coecients in (31) are time invariant. Conceptually, this regression
is problematic. The main reason is that prices were liberalized in January 1985, so the
28\market" prices before 1985 are not true market prices. As discussed in Section 2, \market"
or rathar \negotiated" prices were still under tight price control to keep them close to their
corresponding plan prices. As a result, changes in plan prices would inﬂuence changes in
\market" prices before 1985. It is thus unlikely that the plan price of output is uncorrelated
with the idiosyncratic error term nt,m a k i n gl n pi
nt an invalid instrument over the time
period between 1980 and 1984. The estimates under this specication are likely biased.
Indeed as shown in Panel B of Table 6, this specication is rejected by Hansen's (1982) test
of over-identifying restrictions at 5% signicance level.
In Columns 2 and 3 (GMM2), I report GMM estimates of (31) in a specication that
allows parameters to vary before and after the price liberalization. The estimates before
and after 1985 are substantially dierent. A Wald test of parameter stability rejects the
null hypothesis that the parameters are time invariant at 1% signicance level.30 This is
now intuitive. The estimates for the period between 1980 and 1984 are likely biased since
the plan price pi
nt is unlikely to be a valid instrument before price liberalization. Perhaps
because estimates of the parameters for the post-liberalization period are unbiased, this
specication (GMM2) is not rejected by Hansen's test of over-identifying restrictions which
has a p-value equal to 0.20.
Given the problem with pre-1985 \market" prices, I rerun the regression using a subsam-
ple that contains observations between 1985 and 1989. The regression results are reported
in Column 4 (GMM3). Deleting pre-1985 observations changes the parameter estimates
only slightly when compared to the post-liberalization estimates in Column 3. But it raises
the p-value of Hansen's test (to 0.35).
A comparison of the GMM estimates with the OLS estimates in Columns 6 and 7
reveals that there are substantial dierences between the two estimates. For one, GMM
estimates of the eect of output quota on the market price of output are much stronger
than OLS estimates. Conceptually, an increase in the demand for the output, if anticipated
by the ocial, would induce the ocial to raise the output quota. One therefore expects
that changes in output quota be positively correlated with the idiosyncratic error nt.T h e
positive correlation would tend to bias the OLS estimate of the coecient on Qnt upward
(or downward in absolute value). This oers a plausible explanation for noted dierences
bewteen OLS and GMM estimates of the coecient on Qnt.
30The test statistics, distributed 
2 with 4 degrees of freedom under the null, is 31.35, while the 1% critical
value is only 13.3.
29The GMM estimates oer additional evidence in support of the hypothesis of imper-
fect competition. Under perfect competition, the market price of output should equal the
marginal cost of production. This has two implications. First, an increase in the output
quota that a rm faces should not aect production on the margin, even though it will
aect the rm's protability since imposing an output quota is equivalent to imposing a
lump sum tax. This implication is contradicted by empirical evidence. The GMM estimates
of the coecient on Qnt is negative and statistically signicantly dierent from zero. The
second implication of marginal cost pricing is that any percentage change in the marginal
cost of production should translate into an equal percentage change in the market price of
output. The estimated elasticities of the market price of output with respect to the input
price and the base wage rate are 0.151 and 0.220, implying that a one percentage point
increase in both input price and in wage rate would increase output price by 0.371%. The
estimated elasticities appear too small to support the implied complete pass-through of the
marginal cost to the market price of output. But under imperfect competition, an increase
in the marginal cost need not be translated into an equal increase in the market price of
output. Table 3 shows that during the sample period, market prices of material inputs rose
much faster than market prices of output, suggesting that on average some of the increases
in input prices were \absorbed" by state-owned enterprises through reduced prots and
improved productivity (Li, 1997).
In sum, the empirical analysis has shown that the allocation of in-plan resources between
1980{89 in China exhibits strong empirical patterns, and that these patterns strongly sup-
port the joint hypothesis of ocial corruption and imperfectly competitive product markets.
The analysis has also shown that there is little qualitative change in the patterns of in-plan
resource allocation before and after the full implementation of the dual-track system in 1985.
This nding suggests that the diversion of in-plan resources was a not a new phenomenon,
rather it thrived even before the formal introduction of the dual-track system.
4.5 Discussion
While this paper oers strong evidence for the Shleifer-Vishny eect of corruption on re-
source allocation, it is useful to point out a subtle but important dierence in the industrial
organization of corruption in China from that analyzed in Shleifer and Vishny (1993). In
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), each corrupt ocial is a monopolist providing government-
30owned goods and services for private gain. There exists no other channel by which one
could obtain the goods or services. In this case, one way to reduce corruption is to intro-
duce competition by allowing more than one ocial to provide identical services. Under
the dual-track system, however, the corrupt ocial competes against the producer of the
good that he diverts.
Conceptually, the corruption under the Chinese dual-track system would be identical
to that in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) if the corrupt ocial and the rm collude perfectly
so that the interests of the ocial and the rm are perfectly aligned. The rm-ocial
combination in this case would set aside just enough output, say d, for sale on the market
to satisfy any bureaucratic requirement. But it would produce and procure, at the margin,
output at the plan price p and then divert a portion of the procured output the market.
The production would not be determined by equating the marginal revenue to the marginal
cost of production, rather it would be determined by equating the marginal revenue to the
plan price plus the marginal cost of diversion. Just as in Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the
cost of production would be immaterial to the allocation of in-plan resources as long as
it is borne by the government. As a result, changes in the market price of input and in
the wage rate should have negligible eects on Qnt. The predictions are inconsistent with
the estimated positive coecients on lnMi
nt and lnWnt in Panel A of Table 5. The results
provide evidence supporting Byrd's (1992) nding in a case study that there are sucient
conﬂicts of interest between the ocial and the rm.
While the evidence suggests that the dual-track system introduced competition against
corrupt ocials, the competition here is dierent from the type discussed in Shleifer and
Vishny (1993). In Shleifer and Vishny (1993) competition comes from other corrupt ocials
oering identical services, so it could force the equilibrium market price to converge to the
plan price and eliminate corruption all together. Under the Chinese dual-track system, the
rm faces the quota imposed by the ocial, so its output or pricing decisions are dependent
on the actions of the ocial. We therefore expect that the competition between the rm and
the ocial be less intensive than the competition between ocials oering identical services.
The competition identied here is not expected to have much restraint on corruption.
315 Conclusion
Exploiting a unique data set containing detailed transaction and price data from a panel of
769 Chinese state-owned enterprises, this paper estimates corruption proceeds from ocial
diversion and analyzes the eects of corruption on resource allocation. Estimates of cor-
ruption proceeds range from 8% of GNP in 1980 to 11% of GNP in 1988. Corruption was
pervasive both before and after the full implementation of the dual-track system in 1985.
More important, corruption is found to have signicant impact on the allocation of both
in-plan and outside-plan resources under the dual-track system in China in ways that are
consistent with implications of an extended version of Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) model
of corruption. The xed-eects tobit regressions show that an increase in the plan output
price | part of the marginal cost that the corrupt ocial faces | signicantly lowers the
procurement and diversion of output quota both before and after the implementation of the
dual-track system.
The xed-eects tobit regressions also provide evidence that the product markets in
China in the 1980s were not perfectly competitive. Estimates of the eects on output
and input quotas of the market output price, the market price of input and the wage
rate are inconsistent with the joint hypothesis of corruption and perfect competition, but
consistent with the joint hypothesis of corruption and imperfect competition. The evidence
suggests that the market output price cannot be treated as an exogenous variable to the rm.
Subsequent GMM regressions of the output pricing equation provides coroborating evidence
in favor of the joint hypothesis of corruption and imperfect competition. In particular, it
is found that an increase in the output quota imposed on the rm would help lower the
market price of output (after controlling for the implied endogeneity). This nding provides
evidence supporting the model of the dual-track system in Li (1999).
The ndings suggest that it was not the dual-track system per se that bred corruption:
Corruption had been pervasive before the full implementation of the dual-track system in
1985. The culprit is the continued reliance on the plan. By introducing the market track, the
dual-track system represents a half-way move from the plan toward the market. Economic
benets of such a move have been studied in depth (see for example Byrd, 1991; Lau et al.,
1997; Li, 1999; Lau et al., forthcoming). But, as the evidence in this paper shows, this reform
strategy has a serious downside | corruption. The dual-track system allowed corruption to
continue to exert an allocative role in the economy. This allocation is distorted since corrupt
32ocials would procure and divert more resources the larger the gaps between market and
plan prices. Given the arbitrariness of the plan prices, some goods may be over-procured and
hence over-produced while others under-produced. However, this misallocation might be
partially mitigated by the limited competition between corrupt ocials and the producers.
In addition, the introduction of the market track helped monetize corruption and may have
signicantly reduced the transaction costs of ocial diversion. Under tight price control,
corrupt ocials would have to rely on costly barter exchanges to trade diverted goods.
By reducing the transaction costs of corruption, the dual-track system may have increased
the pervasiveness of corruption in China. By helping monetize corruption, the dual-track
system also heightened public awareness of corruption.
Public outrage against corruption and the lack of ocial accountability erupted in 1989.
Massive demonstrations were held in Tiananmen Square from April 18 until June 4 1989.
The bloody crackdown that followed has turned out to be a watershed event for China.
Although the post-crackdown government has yet to introduce democratic reforms, it did
try to tighten the oversight over ocial behavior. After a short hiatus, economic reform
resumed and planning was gradually phrased out in the industrial sector.31 On January
1, 1994, China also ended the dual-track system for foreign exchanges by abandoning the
ocial exchange rate and allowing the currency swap markets and later the inter-bank
currency markets to determine the exchange rate for current account purposes.32 By the
mid-1990s, hardly any industrial goods were still allocated under the plan. However, the
government continues to impose centralized control over the nancial sector. It continues to
impose stringent capital control to block the outﬂow of domestic savings, and it continues
to repress deposit and loan interest rates, and to restrict the listing of rms on China's
stock exchanges (Gordon and Li, 1999). As a result of these changes, corruption in China
has gradually shifted from industrial production and distribution sectors of the economy to
31On September 1992, China freeed the prices of all but 111 production materials and delegated control
over 22 of the others to localities. See \China Lifts Controls on Prices of 593 Items," Asian Wall Street
Journal, September 2, 1992.
32The central bank continues to intervene in domestic currency markets and have so far managed to
maintain a stable yuan/$ exchange rate. But under stringent capital control, the yuan remains a non-
convertible currency on the capital account.
33other sectors, most notably the nancial sector.33 By most accounts,34 China remains one
of the most corrupt countries in the world.
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36Table 1: Average ex-factory plan and market prices of four industrial commodities, 1987{
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Commodity Price 1987 1988 1989
Steel Plan 859:80 964:80 1078:00
(yuan/ton) Market 1432:60 1514:60 1870:80
Market/Plan 1:67 1:57 1:74
Aluminum Plan 4367:00 4922:00 5261:00
(yuan/ton) Market 6093:00 8444:00 10430:00
Market/Plan 1:40 1:72 1:98
Coal Plan 35:89 39:54 42:25
(yuan/ton) Market 80:00 110:00 153:40
Market/Plan 2:23 2:78 3:63
Timber Plan 150:00 158:15 160:62
(yuan/m3) Market 368:87 435:38 481:40
Market/Plan 2:46 2:75 3:00
Source: Yang and Li (1993), p. 58{59.
37Table 2: Comparing market sales and market purchases by state-owned enterprises, 1987.
Proportion of output Proportion of input
sold by producers bought by rms
at market prices at market prices
Steel 22% 55%
Cement 66% 85%
Non-ferrous metals 33% N/A1
Aluminum N/A1 48%
Chemical raw materials 36% N/A1
Caustic soda N/A1 52%
Source: Huang and Li (1991, p. 225).
1 Not available.
38Table 3: Dual-track system as seen from a diverse sample of state-owned enterprises.
Output Material Inputs














Inﬂationa 100%b Plan P Inﬂationc 100%d Plan P
1981 0.6 3.3 69 1.3 22.3 60
1982 2.4 5.4 69 1.0 15.9 58
1983 2.2 4.4 69 2.0 30.8 56
1984 3.2 5.8 68 7.1 24.0 53
1985 7.3 15.5 66 5.2 29.8 46
1986 9.3 25.5 66 19.0 41.4 42
1987 4.6 17.1 65 11.9 63.4 38
1988 22.0 15.9 67 39.6 84.4 34
1989 21.2 39.3 65 18.7 117.1 32
Market prices between 1980 and 1984 were measured as the \negotiated" prices, which
remained under price control until January 1985.
a Percentage change in market prices this year over the previous year, weighted by total
sales measured in market prices.
b Weighted by total sales measured in plan prices.
c Percentage change in market prices this year over the previous year, weighted by total
purchases of inputs measured in market prices.
d Weighted by total purchases of inputs measured in plan prices.
39Table 4: Estimates of corruption proceeds using accounting data reported by state-owned
enterprises.
Output Input Corruption Sales-Weighted Unweighted
quota quota proceeds (R) R/Sales Imputed R/Sales
Year per rma per rma per rmb (t-ratio)c R/GNPd (t-ratio)c
1980 33.6 18.6 15.0 22% (2.2) 8% {2.5% ({0.3)
1981 32.2 16.0 16.1 26% (4.3) 8% 5.5% (1.0)
1982 30.4 16.8 13.6 29% (5.5) 9% 12% (2.0)
1983 32.0 21.5 10.5 23% (4.5) 7% 15% (3.3)
1984 33.9 20.4 13.4 27% (5.5) 8% 21% (5.1)
1985 36.2 20.6 15.6 29% (7.8) 8% 23% (6.6)
1986 37.7 17.4 20.2 36% (10.9) 9% 31% (12.8)
1987 45.6 17.1 28.5 47% (6.8) 11% 34% (10.0)
1988 45.2 14.1 31.0 47% (13.3) 11% 41% (20.3)
1989 44.2 14.1 30.1 45% (11.0) 10% 39% (16.0)
1980{89 37.2 17.7 19.6 35% (14.3) 9% 31% (19.2)
a Average output and input quotas per rm are measured in 1989 market prices (millions
of yuan).
b Corruption proceeds = market value of output quota − market value of input quota.
c The number in parentheses are t-ratios. Robust standard errors for the estimates are
estimated by regressing R/GIO on year dummies with correction for hetroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
d Corruption proceeds as a proportion of GNP is computed using (25). Data source:
state-owned enterprises' contribution to national gross value of industrial output, State
Statistical Bureau (1991), p. 396; industrial sector's contribution to GNP, State Statis-
tical Bureau (1991), p. 31.
40Table 5: Estimation of the output quota equation (29) (Panel A) and input quota equa-
tion (30) (Panel B) using Honor e's semi-parametric xed-eects Tobit. The dependent
variables, Qnt and Xnt, are measured in 1989 market prices. For specications under per-
fectly competitive output market, an additional regressor, \log market output price" is
added. The time-specic eects, estimated by including year dummies in the regression,
are not reported below. Estimation and hypothesis testing are done using Pantob, a li-
brary of GAUSS routines provided by Bo Honor e. The estimator uses the absolute value
loss function. The numbers reported in parentheses are t-ratios (asymptotically normal
statistics).
A. Output quota equation (29), Qnt (10 millions of yuan)
Imperfectly competitive mkts Perfectly competitive mkts
1980{89 1980{84 1985{89 1980{89 1980{84 1985{89
Log market output price, lnP i
nt -0.157 -0.319 -0.107
(-1.227) (-1.539) (-0.887)
Log plan output price, lnpi
nt -0.534 -0.730 -0.566 -0.421 -0.430 -0.472
(-4.821) (-6.968) (-5.087) (-3.248) (-2.327) (-4.080)
Log market input price, lnMi
nt 0.419 0.374 0.420 0.489 0.515 0.444
(3.676) (3.103) (3.740) (4.321) (4.113) (3.822)
Log plan input price, lnmi
nt -0.175 -0.053 -0.157 -0.199 -0.147 -0.125
(-1.686) (-0.466) (-1.376) (-1.944) (-1.336) (-1.153)
Log base wage rate, lnWnt 0.395 0.115 0.655 0.396 -0.091 0.610
(4.986) (1.390) (4.702) (5.021) (-0.869) (4.594)
Observations [% censored] 7086 [22%] 7086 [22%] 7086 [22%] 7086 [22%]
B. Input quota equation (30), Xnt (10 millions of yuan)
Imperfectly competitive mkts Perfectly competitive mkts
1980{89 1980{84 1985{89 1980{89 1980{84 1985{89
Log market output price, lnP i
nt 0.131 -0.099 0.077
(2.032) (-0.661) (1.141)
Log plan output price, lnpi
nt 0.055 0.096 0.019 -0.062 0.225 -0.022
(1.127) (1.685) (0.373) (-1.073) (1.585) (-0.343)
Log market input price, lnMi
nt -0.219 -0.170 -0.260 -0.225 -0.158 -0.224
(-2.822) (-2.778) (-3.191) (-2.725) (-2.246) (-2.418)
Log plan input price, lnmi
nt -0.027 -0.026 0.013 -0.014 -0.060 -0.024
(-0.369) (-0.412) (0.187) (-0.165) (-0.682) (-0.261)
Log base wage rate, lnWnt 0.026 -0.082 0.163 0.037 -0.059 0.212
(0.602) (-1.436) (2.402) (0.825) (-1.110) (3.245)
Observations [% censored] 4434 [49%] 4434 [49%] 4434 [49%] 4434 [49%]
41Table 6: GMM and OLS estimation of the output pricing equation (31). The dependent
variable is the year-on-year change in the log of market output price index, lnPi
nt.N o t
reported here are time-specic eects, which are estimated by including year dummies each
regressions. Instrumental variables for GMM estimation are a constant, year dummies,
and four exogenous variables (lnMi
nt, l n Wnt, l n pi
nt,a n d l n mi
nt). There is one
over-identifying restriction in specications GMM1 and GMM3. In specication GMM2,
the number of parameters increases by 3, while the number of instruments increases by 4,
giving a total of 2 over-identifying restrictions.
A. Estimation GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 OLS
1981{89 1981{84 1985-89 1985{89 1981{84 1985-89
Year-on-year change in
Output quota Qnt -0.105 -0.028 -0.290 -0.289 -0.003 -0.001
(-1.109) (-0.344) (-4.822) (-4.872) (-6.767) (-1.660)
Log market input price lnMi
nt 0.387 0.538 0.150 0.151 0.509 0.117
(2.940) (2.707) (1.770) (1.756) (28.336) (6.803)
Log base wage rate lnWnt 0.106 0.013 0.215 0.220 0.038 0.074
(1.159) (0.146) (2.361) (2.411) (1.857) (4.551)
Intercept -0.022 -0.019 0.118 -0.011
(-0.979) (-1.070) (3.774) (-1.622)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 6439 6439 3655 6439
B. Testing over-identifying restrictions
Hansen's statitics, 2(DF) 4.27 3.19 0.80
Degress of freedom (DF) 1 2 1
p-value 0.04 0.20 0.37
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